

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 144648
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SE:RCEWING:AM
APPROVED BY C:MNIMETZ
GVEST
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TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
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USMISSION USUN NEU YORK
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION USNATO
USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 144648

EXDIS; USEEC

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, GR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GREEK PRIME MINISTER
KARAMANLIS, NEW YORK, JUNE 3, 1978

1. SUMMARY; SECRETARY MET WITH GREEK PRIME MINISTER
KARAMANLIS AT LATTER'S REQUEST AT HOTEL CARLYLE IN NEW YORK
SATURDAY, JUNE 3. MEETING, WHICH LASTED ALMOST ONE HOUR,
COVERED FOLLOWING TOPICS; GREECE/NATO RELATIONS; GOG
ATTITUDE TOWARD ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO REPEAL TURKISH
ARMS EMBARGO; GREECE/TURKISH RELATIONS; AND CYPRUS.
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AMBASSADORS ALEXANDRAKIS AND PAPOULIAS; AND MOLYVIATIS,
DIRECTOR GENERAL, PRIME MINISTER'S POLITICAL OFFICE, WHO
ACTED AS INTERPRETER. SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSE-
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5. KARAMANLIS SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS OF NO DIRECT INTEREST TO THE U.S., HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED BY RECENT

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6. GREECE/TURKEY RELATIONS. KARAMANLIS RECALLED HIS PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR ADDRESSING AEGEAN QUESTIONS OF DIALOGUE FOLLOWED BY INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OR RESORT TO THE ICJ. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE QUESTIONS ALSO WERE NOT OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE U.S. BUT HE HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD FOLLOW THE MATTER, REVIEW THE GREEK CONFIDENTIAL

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8. IN RESPONSE TO ABOVE POINTS, THE SECRETARY SAID HE VERY MUCH UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF A RESTORED GREEK-NATO RELATIONSHIP. FOLLOWING HIS JANUARY VISIT, THE U.S. HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN FACILITATING STEPS TOWARD RE-INTEGRATION; KARAMANLIS CONFIRMED THIS WAS THE CASE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS NOT INFORMED ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL TALKS BEING CONDUCTED BY GENERAL HAIG AND H: WAS NOT AWARE THAT TURKEY WAS "BLOCKING" EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT. WE THOUGHT GREEK RETURN TO NATO WAS IMPORTANT AND WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS.

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11. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION ABOUT THE MAY 29 KARAMANLIS MEETING WITH ECEVIT, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A RATHER FORMAL MEETING AND HAD NOT GOTTEN VERY FAR INTO SUBSTANCE. HE HAD INITIATED THE MEETING AND WAS PLEASED THAT THE DIALOGUE WOULD CONTINUE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY WHEN THE TWO MFA SECRETARIES GENERAL MET JULY 4 TO REVIEW THE MONTREUX DISCUSSION AND THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. HE AGAIN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT GOT WOULD ACCEPT HIS PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME MENTION TO THE TURKS OUR HOPE THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IN RESOLVING TURKISH-GREEK BILATERAL PROBLEMS. HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY SINCE BOTH ECEVIT AND KARAMANLIS HAD THE POLITICAL DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD IN IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. KARAMANLIS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE RESULT OF THE ICJ OR ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, BUT NEEDED TO HAVE POLITICAL COVER FOR ACCEPTING A SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT PRINCIPLE WAS INVOLVED MORE THAN SPECIFIC SUBSTANCE. "THERE IS NO OIL WHERE WE ARE SQUABBLING".

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRIME MINISTER, MEETINGS, VISITS, HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE144648
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: RCEWING:AM
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780238-0762
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
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Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780684/aaaacupz.tel
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Litigation Code IDs:
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Litigation History:
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Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2448387
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GREEK PRIME MINISTER KARAMANLIS, NEW YORK, JUNE 3, 1978
TAGS: PEPR, GR, US, (KARAMANLIS, CONSTANTINE)
To: ATHENS
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/2cd1cc8f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014